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Abstract 
Increasing energy efficiency and savings will play a key role in the achievement of the climate and 
energy targets in the European Union (EU). To meet the EU’s objectives for greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, renewable energy use and energy efficiency improvements, its member states 
have implemented and will design and implement various energy policies. This paper reviews a 
range of scientific articles on the topic of policy instruments for energy efficiency and savings and 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of different measures. The review demonstrates the variety 
of possible instruments and points to the complex policy environment, in which not a single 
instrument can meet the respective energy efficiency targets, but which requires a combination of 
multiple instruments. Therefore, the paper in particular focuses on assessing potential interactions 
between combinations of energy efficiency policies, i.e. the extent to which the different 
instruments counteract or support one another. So far, the literature on energy efficiency policy 
has paid only limited attention to the effect of interacting policies. This paper reviews and analyses 
interaction effects thus far identified with respect to factors that determine the interaction. Drawing 
on this review, we identify cases for interaction effects between energy efficiency policies to assess 
their potential existence systematically and to show future research needs. 
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1. Introduction 
Energy efficiency policy will play a key role in meeting the EU’s energy targets, addressing environmental, energy 
security and economic challenges. Policy makers can choose from a range of policy instruments to foster future 
energy efficiency and savings1 and indeed, they have chosen to implement multiple policy instruments on various 
policy levels all targeting efficiency and savings. Given the policy crowded environment, policy interactions are 
inevitable (Oikonomou et al. 2010; Rosenow et al. 2016). As the number of implemented instruments increases, 
so does the incidence of interactions between them. These interactions may be complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, however, there may as well be a risk for overlapping policies and mitigating effects between them 
(Boonekamp 2006; Braathen 2007, Oikonomou et al. 2010; Rosenow et al. 2016). 
In November 2016, the European Commission proposed a binding energy efficiency target for the EU of 30% 
energy savings until 2030 compared to business as usual scenario (European Commission 2016). This target will 
likely become even more stringent in view of the European Energy Roadmap 2050, in which the European 
Commission highlights that the focus in transforming the future energy system should remain on energy efficiency 
and savings. They propose that a sustainable transformation requires further improvement with respect to energy 
efficiency of new and existing buildings, efficiency investments by households and companies, and incentives for 
behavioural change (European Commission 2011). Considering that the need for a well-functioning instrument 
mix will likely increase, it is crucial for policy makers to achieve a better understanding of the effectiveness of 
different instruments and especially instrument combinations. 
This paper provides an overview and evaluation of major energy efficiency policies that aim at increasing 
efficiency and savings on a household, and small and medium-scale industry level. Furthermore, it investigates 
the potential interaction effects between different combinations of these policies.2 Interaction effects between 
energy efficiency policies are to date underrepresented in the literature (e.g. Markandya et al. 2015; Rosenow et 
al. 2016). This paper shall reduce the gap of knowledge by gathering and analysing interaction effects, which the 
limited research on this topic has identified so far. Drawing on this analysis, we define relevant influencing factors 
and exemplify specific interaction cases. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review a number of policies for energy efficiency and 
savings and assess these policies with respect to effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility criteria. In section 3, we 
focus on interaction effects between combinations of policy instruments, applying an assessment of interaction 
effects between energy efficiency policies. Section 4 summarises the results and discusses the need for future 
research and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Review of policy instruments for energy efficiency and savings 
One major rational for implementing energy efficiency policy is to reduce negative externalities associated with 
the production and consumption of energy, i.e. primarily greenhouse gas emissions. Following traditional 
economic theory and assuming that negative externalities are the major market failure to address in order to reduce 
final energy consumption, a single instrument could cost-effectively lead to a pareto-optimal outcome (Stiglitz and 
Rosengaard 2015). In that case, the internalisation of external costs, e.g. through energy taxation, and the 
associated increase in energy prices would incentivise the reduction of (fossil) energy use by absolute savings or 
energy efficiency investment (Lecuyer and Bibas 2012). Applying market-based instruments as a first best solution 
requires fully competitive market conditions besides the externality, e.g. rationality of individuals, perfect 
information and lack of transaction costs. Yet, researchers in this field commonly argue that in the markets for 
energy efficiency and savings market failures and barriers beyond the negative externality problem exist. These 
                                                          
1 We use the classical definitions of energy efficiency and savings: Energy efficiency relates to the ratio between energy con-
sumption and the amount of energy service or production obtainable, whereas energy savings concern the absolute reduction 
in final energy consumed, which the end-user can achieve through investment in technical energy efficiency improvement or 
behavioral change. In this paper, both concepts represent the same policy target of a reduction in final energy consumption. 
2 Future research could make a similar assessment shifting the scope to further sectors, e.g. public, commercial and large-scale 
industries, where different policies and policy interactions would be relevant to investigate. 
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market failures and barriers cause a suboptimal level of energy efficiency, i.e. from an economic point of view, 
energy end-users have not realised all cost-effective efficiency potential, and explain the existence of the ‘energy 
efficiency gap’ (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). The failures and barriers include, e.g. imperfect and asymmetric 
information, principal agent problems, behavioural failures, including bounded rationality, and limited access to 
capital3. Thus, the portfolio of energy efficiency policies also includes instruments addressing these failures and 
barriers: financial incentives, regulatory and non-regulatory measures, and information and feedback. 
A large number of instruments and an equally extensive amount of literature on policies aiming at energy efficiency 
improvements and absolute energy savings exists. The review gives an overview of instruments promoting energy 
efficiency and savings at the end-use level. Thus, the considered instruments create a framework or requirement 
for industries or households to invest in energy efficient technology and products or provide an incentive to save 
energy through behavioural change. As the specific implementation of a policy instrument is context dependent, 
the aim is to point at generally relevant policy characteristics in the following assessment. 
2.1. Comparative assessment 
Table 1 shows the assessment of energy efficiency policies, defining policy categories and applying effectiveness, 
efficiency and feasibility criteria. A major criterion to evaluate policies aiming at energy efficiency and savings is 
the extent to which they are effective in fostering energy efficiency improvements and increasing energy savings. 
Static efficiency (i.e. cost-effectiveness) assesses the ability of an instrument to achieve its target at least cost. This 
efficiency criterion requires the policy design to realise the relatively cheapest savings first. Dynamic efficiency, 
which will partly be included in the assessment, defines the ability of an instrument to give a long-term incentive 
for technological progress. The feasibility criteria refer to institutional demands, i.e. organisational capacity or 
knowledge that is required for the implementation of a policy, and governmental concerns, i.e. distributional 
impacts, administrative costs and other positive or negative effects that may be of concern for a governmental 
regulator. In the following, a number of theoretical and empirical studies highlight different aspects of the table. 
Market-based instruments 
A too low energy price that does not internalise the external costs caused by energy production and consumption 
discourages the adoption of energy efficiency and saving measures. Market-based instruments challenge this 
problem by adding external costs to the energy price and thereby incentivising energy efficiency and savings based 
on market mechanisms (e.g. Stiglitz and Rosengaard 2015). 
An energy tax on consumption increases the price of energy, giving a direct incentive to reduce final energy use. 
However, if end-users do not respond to a change in energy prices, the effectiveness of a tax may be very small. 
Studies assessing energy price elasticities found inelastic energy demand in the short run, while long-run 
elasticities are larger (Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. 2002; Gillingham et al. 2009). Empirical evidence on the impact of 
energy price changes on the adoption of energy efficient technology and innovation supports the finding of larger 
long-run elasticities (e.g. Ley et al. 2016; Popp 2002). 
Tradable emission permits and emission taxes primarily target emission reductions and we therefore define them 
as an indirect energy efficiency policy. Yet, energy efficiency improvements and savings are one major way to 
reduce emissions. The sectors that are covered by a trading scheme or are exposed to emission taxation may pass 
on their abatement costs and affect final energy prices. Due to this effect, sectors not directly exposed to a price 
on emissions, typically households and non-energy intensive industries, also have an incentive to reduce their 
energy consumption. This indirect impact on energy savings depends on the actual increase in energy prices and 
the relevant price elasticities (European Parliament 2013; Schleich et al. 2009). 
                                                          
3 Market barriers include any disincentives to invest in energy efficiency or reduce energy consumption. Not all barriers can 
be defined as a market failure in a welfare economic perspective, e.g. uncertainty, irreversibility of energy efficiency investment 
and bounded rationality. For a detailed discussion on market failures and barriers to energy efficiency see for example 
Gillingham et al. (2009); Jaffe and Stavins (1994), Linares and Labandeira (2010). 
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Energy efficiency obligation (EEO) schemes exist in various ways; thus, there is no consistent definition of the 
incentive mechanism of this instrument. In general, EEOs set a quantitative energy savings target for energy 
companies (e.g. suppliers or distributors), who have to achieve the targeted reduction in end-use energy 
consumption in a given period. Within a tradable scheme, the obligated parties receive a certificate for energy 
saving achievements and can trade these certificates among one another. This instrument design is known as 
tradable white certificate (TWC) scheme4. The TWC scheme uses market mechanisms to achieve cost-effective 
energy savings, while an EEO scheme is based on a regulatory framework, which, however, leaves it to the 
obligated parties how to deliver energy savings. To reach the targeted savings, energy companies typically provide 
financial incentives for energy efficiency investment and/or give information on potential energy efficiency 
improvement. Thus, on the end-user level, where final energy savings are realised, EEO/TWC schemes translate 
into financial support or tailored information provision and have the potential to challenge multiple market failures 
and barriers to energy efficiency (Giraudet and Finon 2014). First, the instrument addresses negative externalities 
through investments (or purchases of certificates) to fulfil the obligation and thereby the internalisation of 
additional costs. Second, EEO/TWC schemes address financial barriers and information failures when providing 
financial incentives for energy efficiency investments and information respectively. 
Furthermore, auction mechanisms for energy efficiency investments, e.g. in terms of tendering schemes and 
capacity market participation, use market-based bidding processes to foster energy efficiency and savings at lowest 
costs. E.g. in Europe, Germany has launched a tendering program for the support of industrial energy saving 
investments and the United Kingdom are testing, whether energy efficiency measures could compete in capacity 
markets (OECD/IEA 2017). However, these mechanisms are to date less established and in a pilot stage. 
Financial incentives 
Financial incentives address the issue of high investment costs, which constitute a potential barrier for energy 
efficiency improvements, motivating energy efficiency investments through subsidies (direct payments, tax 
rebates, grants and loans). Policy makers typically choose to apply these instruments to incentivise specific product 
purchases (Galarraga et al. 2016) and to support certain technologies (Bertoldi et al. 2013). Empirical findings 
show that financial incentives increase energy efficiency investment (Datta and Filippini 2016; Datta and Gulati 
2014; Markandya et al. 2009), however they are also associated with two main drawbacks: the free-rider problem 
and the rebound effect5. Researchers in the field have investigated that households and industries are likely to free 
ride on financial support provided (e.g. Grösche and Vance 2009) and further that subsidies on a product level may 
increase the number demanded of that product and increase final energy consumption (e.g. Galarraga et al. 2013).  
Regulatory measures 
Within energy efficiency policy, regulatory measures translate into codes and standards, e.g. building codes or 
energy performance standards. Thus, they typically enforce producers to supply energy efficient options and 
impose consumers to reduce their energy consumption by installing or purchasing a particular product. Having 
this impact on decision-making, regulatory measures tackle information failures, bounded rationality and principal 
agent problems (Linares and Labandeira 2010). As a number of case studies have analysed, appliance standards 
have a significant energy saving potential (e.g. Augustus de Melo and de Martino Jannuzzi 2010; Lu 2006; 
Rosenquist et al. 2006; Schiellerup 2002). Further, Kjærbye et al. (2010) show that the tightening of the Danish 
building codes has been effective with respect to energy consumption per m2. However, building codes give no 
incentives to achieve efficiency and savings beyond the compliance threshold (e.g. Jacobsen, 2016). 
 
                                                          
4 See Bertoldi and Rezessy (2008) for a comprehensive overview of fundamental concepts behind tradable white certificate 
schemes. 
5 Free-riders are agents who make use of an incentive program, although they would have invested in energy efficiency im-
provements without any financial support. The free-riding problem therefore challenges the additionality of energy savings 
achieved through financial incentives. The rebound effect causes an increase in final energy consumption and may occur due 
to an effective price reduction once energy efficiency improves (Greening et al. 2000). Alternatively, an increase in the total 
number and the size of certain energy consuming products in use may increase final energy consumption, when e.g. a subsidy 
reduces initial investment costs (Galarraga et al. 2013; Markandya et al. 2015). 
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Information and feedback 
Suboptimal investment in energy efficiency may occur to a significant extent due to information and behavioural 
failures6 (e.g. Ramos et al. 2015). Information campaigns, certificates, labels and audits, or feedback measures can 
address these failures. Certificates and labels give information on the energy efficiency performance of certain 
products, e.g. buildings and residential appliances. Energy audits provide tailored information on cost-effective 
energy efficiency and saving potential, mainly on a household or firm level, whereas feedback measures reveal 
consumers’ energy use, e.g. through smart meters, which provide detailed and frequent information on energy 
consumption, or bills with comparative data (Ramos et al. 2015). Ramos et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive 
overview of empirical results, which investigate the effect of certificates and labels on the consumers’ decision-
making process. Looking at sales prices or rents of different energy products, these results show that consumers 
positively value both measures. Barbetta et al. (2015) provide a case study, in which the provision of information 
does not have a significant effect on the implementation of energy efficiency investments. They conclude that 
within public non-residential buildings in Italy, information is not sufficient to promote investments. Further 
studies have found similar results with respect to the energy saving potential of information provision (e.g. 
Kjærbye 2008; Larsen and Jensen 1999). Gleerup et al. (2010) study the impact of immediate feedback via text 
messages or email on household electricity consumption and find energy savings of about 3% due to the feedback 
measure. Yet, Buchanan et al. (2015) indicate potential problems associated with feedback measures and question 
their effectiveness, particularly focusing on the necessity of user engagement. In general, the impact of information 
and feedback measures is unclear. 
Non-regulatory measures 
Rezessy and Bertoldi (2011) define voluntary agreements as, ‘tailor-made negotiated covenants between the public 
authorities and individual firms or groups of firms which include targets and timetables for action aimed at 
improving energy efficiency or reducing GHG emissions and define rewards and penalties’ (Rezessy and Bertoldi 
2011: 7121). As this definition indicates, voluntary agreements primarily target the industry sector, thus various 
agreement schemes between governments and industries exist. Johannsen (2002) evaluates the Danish agreement 
scheme on energy efficiency between the national energy agency and energy-intensive industries. He concludes 
that the agreement has an impact on the firms’ investment behaviour; however, administrative costs are high for 
both, government and firms. Rietbergen et al. (2002) analyse the long-term agreements on industrial energy 
efficiency improvement in The Netherlands targeting the energy-intensive manufacturing industry. They conclude 
that the agreements are effective given ambitious targets, supporting measures (e.g. energy audits, financial 
incentives and support schemes for innovation) and credible monitoring. 
                                                          
6 Information problems include imperfect, asymmetric information and split incentives, and behavioural failures refer to any 
departure from perfect rationality. 
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Evaluation criteria 
Policies Effectiveness 
Static/dynamic 
efficiency 
Feasibility – 
Institutional demands 
Feasibility – 
Governmental concerns 
Summary –  
Strengths and weaknesses References 
Market-based instruments 
Energy tax The effectiveness of a tax on energy 
use depends on the size of the tax, 
the relevant price elasticity and 
costs for consumers to reduce their 
energy consumption. When the 
price elasticity of energy demand is 
low or the costs for a reduction in 
energy consumption are high, the 
energy saving effect may be limited. 
In both cases, consumers pay the tax 
instead of reducing their energy 
consumption. 
Flexibility regarding the 
means to reduce final en-
ergy consumption pro-
motes cost reductions. 
The price effect incentiv-
ises technological pro-
gress, assuming some 
price responsiveness. 
The regulator needs to 
set an adequate tax rate, 
which gives an incentive 
to save energy/improve 
energy efficiency - opti-
mally based on the social 
costs of energy produc-
tion and consumption. 
Finding this rate may be 
challenging. 
On the one side, taxes cre-
ate a revenue, which gov-
ernments can potentially 
use to reduce other distor-
tive taxes in their tax sys-
tem. On the other side 
taxes may be regressive, 
thus impose a greater bur-
den on low-income house-
holds. 
A tax on energy enables to internalise 
external costs associated with the pro-
duction and consumption of energy. 
The corresponding effect on energy 
prices gives a direct incentive for cost-
effective savings, efficiency improve-
ments and technological change. Taxes 
create a governmental revenue and 
thus the possibility for a double divi-
dend. However, low price elasticities 
and the regressive nature of environ-
mental taxes negatively affect effec-
tiveness and feasibility respectively. 
Berkhout et al. (2004); 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. 
(2002); 
Ley et al. (2016); 
OECD (2013); 
Popp (2002) 
 
 
 
Tradable 
emission per-
mits and 
emission tax 
The energy saving effect of both in-
struments depends on (1) the costs 
for alternative abatement options, 
e.g. if reducing process emissions is 
cheaper than reducing energy con-
sumption, the energy saving effect 
may be limited and (2) the permit 
price or level of the emission tax 
and the effect on final energy prices. 
 
Flexibility regarding the 
means to reduce emis-
sions promotes cost re-
ductions. 
The price effect incentiv-
ises technological pro-
gress. 
The regulator needs to 
issue a quantity of per-
mits that ensures the ef-
fectiveness of the instru-
ment or set an adequate 
tax rate, which gives an 
incentive to reduce emis-
sions. Especially the 
trading scheme requires 
reliable measurement 
and monitoring. 
Taxes and auctioned emis-
sion permits create a reve-
nue, which governments 
can potentially use to re-
duce other distortive taxes 
in their tax system. A free 
distribution of permits 
raises distributional issues, 
e.g. referring to windfall 
profits for the receiving 
firms. 
Tradable emission permits and emis-
sion taxes internalise external costs 
and the corresponding effect on energy 
prices can give a direct incentive for 
cost effective energy savings, effi-
ciency improvements and technologi-
cal change. Furthermore, taxes and 
auctioned permits create a governmen-
tal revenue and thus the possibility for 
a double dividend. However, low price 
elasticities may limit the energy saving 
effect. 
Bertoldi et al. (2005); 
European Parliament (2013); 
Laing et al. (2014); 
Schleich et al. (2009); 
Sijm (2005) 
EEO 
and TWC 
schemes 
The instruments set a certain energy 
saving target, which the obligated 
parties need to achieve. Thus, a cer-
tain saving effect is ensured (assum-
ing that the obligated parties fulfil 
their obligation). The size of the ef-
fect depends on the level of ambi-
tion. 
The market-based policy 
framework (tradable 
scheme) and the flexibil-
ity in compliance allow 
for cost-effectiveness. If 
the instrument leads to 
cost-effective energy 
savings, depends on the 
concrete policy design. 
EEOs/TWCs are de-
manding with respect to 
their policy design and 
operation. The measure-
ment and verification of 
additional energy sav-
ings due to the obliga-
tion schemes are com-
plex. 
The definition of the pol-
icy framework (tar-
get/measurement/monitor-
ing) involves administra-
tive effort and costs, 
which are higher for trada-
ble schemes. 
EEO/TWC schemes address multiple 
market failures through a combination 
of market-based, regulatory, financial 
and information measures. They re-
quire an administrative effort to de-
sign, implement and monitor the in-
strument and its functionality. This ef-
fort comes along with administrative 
costs, which increase with the com-
plexity of the scheme. 
Bertoldi and Rezessy (2008); 
Bertoldi et al. (2010); 
Giraudet et al. (2011); 
Giraudet and Finon (2014); 
Mundaca (2008); 
Mundaca and Neij (2009); 
Rosenow (2012); 
Togeby et al. (2007) 
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Evaluation criteria 
Policies Effectiveness 
Static/dynamic 
efficiency 
Feasibility –  
Institutional demands 
Feasibility – 
Governmental concerns 
Summary –  
Strengths and weaknesses References 
Financial incentives 
Subsidies 
and access to 
capital 
measures 
Financial support stimulates the de-
velopment and implementation of 
energy efficient products and tech-
nology. The energy saving effect 
depends largely on the free-rider 
percentage, which increases fiscal 
costs without adding effectiveness. 
Furthermore, a rebound effect, in 
the sense that the price reduction 
may result in purchases of larger 
products using more energy, may 
decrease the energy saving effect. 
The instrument finan-
cially supports certain 
products or technologies. 
The reduction in initial 
investment costs of the 
subsidised product/tech-
nology does not incen-
tivise least-cost savings 
or technological pro-
gress. 
Optimally, free-riders 
would need to be identi-
fied in order to reduce 
the fiscal burden. 
The provision of financial 
support causes high fiscal 
costs, which may cause 
distributional effects. 
By reducing initial investment costs, 
financial incentives address financial 
barriers to energy efficiency. They are 
socially and politically popular, apart 
from the financing issue. The incentive 
for energy efficiency investment from 
the provision of financial support is 
larger compared to an equivalent in-
crease in energy prices through taxes 
or tradable permits, a behavioural eco-
nomics issue. However, the free-rider 
problem and a potential rebound effect 
may reduce the effectiveness of the in-
strument. 
Datta and Gulati (2014); 
Datta and Filippini (2016); 
Dubois and Allacker (2015); 
Galarraga et al. (2013); 
Galarraga et al. (2016); 
Grösche and Vance (2009), 
Hou et al. (2016); 
Markandya et al. (2009); 
Nauleau et al. (2015) 
Regulatory measures 
Codes and 
standards 
Regulatory measures can be highly 
effective when they set legislative 
or normative efficiency require-
ments beyond usual business prac-
tice. Yet, mandatory energy effi-
ciency improvements may cause a 
rebound effect, which reduces the 
energy saving effect of these 
measures. 
Regulation prescribes 
the means of achieving 
energy efficiency and 
savings. This inflexibil-
ity negatively affects 
static and dynamic effi-
ciency due to potentially 
high implementation 
costs and a low incentive 
to overachieve standards 
with innovation, unless a 
tightening is likely. 
The implementation of 
regulation is relatively 
easy. Yet, ensuring the 
adequacy of the regu-
lated saving option and 
the monitoring process 
requires a well-informed 
regulator. Furthermore, 
the regulator should con-
stantly update codes and 
standards, when technol-
ogy advances fast. 
The regulator may ques-
tion if regulatory measures 
can in the long run be 
more effective/efficient 
than market forces. 
Regulatory measures are prescriptive 
and therefore address information fail-
ures, principal agent problems and 
bounded rationality, and accelerate 
technology diffusion. Due to their rela-
tively easy implementation and poten-
tial effectiveness, codes and standards 
are popular instruments. However, the 
prescriptive characteristic of the 
measures may lead to high implemen-
tation costs. Furthermore, when tech-
nology advances fast, there is a risk 
that standards may deter instead of 
promote technological progress. 
Augustus de Melo and de 
Martino Jannuzzi (2010); 
Jacobsen (2016); 
Kjærbye et al. (2010); 
Lu (2006); 
Nadel (2002); 
Rosenquist et al. (2006); 
Schiellerup (2002) 
 
  
8 
 
 
Evaluation criteria 
Policies Effectiveness 
Static/dynamic 
efficiency 
Feasibility –  
Institutional demands 
Feasibility – 
Governmental concerns 
Summary –  
Strengths and weaknesses References 
Information and feedback 
Information 
provision 
The energy saving effect of infor-
mation provision is hard to assess. It 
depends on the information design 
and the individual market situation, 
e.g. do market participants actually 
miss information. 
Both static and dynamic 
efficiency are achievable 
only when information is 
effective in changing the 
consumers’ behaviour. 
No measure-specific 
concerns. 
No measure-specific 
concerns. 
Information measures address incom-
plete or asymmetric information and 
behavioural failures, such as bounded 
rationality. Information is not intrusive 
and therefore socially and politically 
popular. However, the energy saving 
effect is unsure. 
Abrahamse et al. (2007); 
Amecke (2012); 
Annunziata et al. (2014); 
Barbetta et al. (2015); 
Ek and Söderholm (2010); 
Kjærbye (2008); 
Larsen and Jensen (1999); 
Ramos et al. (2015); 
Steg (2008) 
Feedback 
provision 
Depending on its quality, frequency 
and persistency, feedback provision 
can change energy consumption be-
haviour and have a significant en-
ergy saving effect. However, con-
sumers might as well increase their 
energy consumption when the feed-
back shows an unexpectedly low 
consumption level. The outcome de-
pends on the individual behaviour 
of end-users. 
The installation of smart 
meters is cost-intensive. 
These costs can be con-
sidered as sunk costs 
when the installation is 
e.g. due to regulation. 
Low cost, e.g. web-
based feedback options 
can be cost-effective. 
No measure-specific 
concerns. 
No measure-specific 
concerns. 
Feedback measures make energy con-
sumption more visible and shall in-
crease the awareness among consum-
ers of their individual consumption 
quantity and potential to control it. 
However, the instrument requires user 
engagement, which might limit its po-
tential effectiveness.  
Allcott and Rogers (2014); 
Buchanan et al. (2015); 
Fischer (2008); 
Gleerup et al. (2010); 
Hargreaves et al. (2013); 
Leiva et al. (2016); 
Zvingilaite and Togeby 
(2015) 
 
Non-regulatory measures 
Voluntary 
agreements 
The effectiveness of voluntary 
agreements highly depends on the 
individual policy framework: Are 
negotiated targets beyond business 
as usual efficiency improvements? 
Is an agreement implemented in 
combination with incentives that 
give a motivation to join and/or to 
comply? Is credible monitoring and 
sanctioning of non-compliance en-
sured? Is there an implicit threat for 
legislative regulation? 
Voluntary agreements 
provide flexibility in 
terms of compliance, 
thus, they are potentially 
cost-effective. 
Agreements that are ne-
gotiated on a sector level 
support the diffusion of 
knowledge and innova-
tion. 
The measure requires a 
policy framework, which 
includes negotiating ef-
fective targets, control-
ling/monitoring compli-
ance and sanctioning 
non-compliance. 
Negotiating and monitor-
ing an agreement causes 
administrative costs. 
Industries may get too 
much influence on policy 
making, thus there is a 
risk for lobbyism. 
 
Voluntary agreements allow the regu-
lator to set requirements that would 
have been infeasible with regulation, 
because the agreements are more ac-
ceptable by industry. When the re-
quirements are beyond business as 
usual efficiency improvements, the 
agreement has an additional energy 
saving effect. Yet, the agreement re-
quires a well-functioning institutional 
framework and negotiations, which are 
demanding for the agreement parties. 
Henriksson and Söderholm 
(2009); 
Johannsen (2002); 
Krarup and Ramesohl (2002); 
Price (2005); 
Rezessy and Bertoldi (2011); 
Rietbergen et al. (2002); 
Stenqvist and Nilsson (2012) 
Table 1: Assessment of policy instruments for energy efficiency and savings with respect to effectiveness, efficiency and feasibility criteria. 
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2.2. Energy efficiency and the policy mix 
The preceding assessment shows the variety of instruments policy makers can choose from when targeting energy 
efficiency improvements and a reduction in energy consumption. Indeed, an evaluation of the European Energy 
Efficiency Directive shows that the member states of the EU have implemented or will implement 479 policy 
measures in total to comply with the European energy efficiency target. The number of policies per country ranges 
from one to 112 (European Parliament 2012). On a national level, governments commonly implement these 
policies in a policy mix, i.e. a combination of instruments all aiming at the same primary target of efficiency 
improvements and savings. Different rationales, of which some are characteristic for energy efficiency policy, 
explain the use of policy combinations. 
As the previous section indicated, market failures and barriers, which lead to a lower energy efficiency level than 
would be optimal, are a major justification for implementing multiple policies in order to address all existing 
failures and barriers (Gillingham et al. 2009; Linares and Labandeira 2010; Markandya et al. 2015). According to 
Tinbergen (1952), who the policy mix literature frequently refers to (e.g. Braathen 2007; Oikonomou et al. 2010; 
Rosenow et al. 2016), there should be one instrument per market failure to overcome the failure and reach a more 
efficient outcome. Braathen (2007) discusses this approach and makes the justified case for applying more 
instruments than market failures when one instrument alone cannot overcome all aspects of a particular failure. 
Nevertheless, the existence of multiple market failures in the markets for energy efficiency justifies the use of 
policy combinations. This rationale not only applies with respect to energy efficiency policy, but also constitutes 
a basic economic rationale that reducing market failure increases social welfare (e.g. Stiglitz and Rosengaard 
2015). 
Furthermore, the imperfection or failure of a policy instrument itself due to political feasibility or acceptance may 
lead to the implementation of multiple policy instruments. In the case of energy efficiency, exemptions from 
regulation for some selected target groups are common practice and lead to distortive incentives for energy 
efficiency and savings. Additional instruments may repair these distortions of among others energy tax exemptions 
in particular due to competitiveness reasons (Council Directive 2003/96/EC). In that case one instrument 
compensates for the weakness of the other instrument and thereby increases the robustness of achieving given 
policy targets. Thus, policy making, which certainly cannot be exogenous of the wider political process, may 
require various policy approaches and therefore the implementation of instrument combinations. 
The specific characteristic of energy efficiency policy that it can target different groups of end-users, and also 
products and technologies, represents another rationale for the combination of multiple instruments. The potential 
to realise reductions in final energy consumption is diverse. E.g., energy savings are achievable on an industry and 
on a household level, moreover, through technological efficiency improvements and behavioural change. 
Considering this complexity, it is reasonable that not a single instrument can achieve energy efficiency 
improvements and savings, but a combination of instruments, which address the various target groups and aim at 
different behavioural factors. The following section 3 will investigate the potential interactions between 
instruments in a policy mix. 
 
3. Interaction effects of energy efficiency policies 
The implementation of multiple instruments all targeting a reduction in energy consumption inevitably promotes 
interactions between these instruments. While a number of studies looks at the interactions between energy and 
climate policies (Spyridaki and Flamos 2014), especially between the EU emissions trading scheme and policies 
for renewable energy use (e.g. Del Rio 2010; Del Rio 2007; Fischer and Preonas 2010; Gawel et al. 2014; OECD 
2011; Sorrell et al. 2003), only a limited number of research has addressed interactions between policies directly 
aiming at energy efficiency and savings. The following section first clarifies the specific definition of interaction 
effects. Second, in order to get an overview of how researchers have assessed interactions between energy 
efficiency policies so far, section 3.2 provides a literature review of relevant studies. Third, section 3.3 further 
assesses the results and conclusions that these studies have drawn. The assessment aims at investigating specific 
factors that influence the interaction effect between instrument combinations and highlighting certain patterns 
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looking at interaction cases, and thereby at contributing to the research on interaction effects between energy 
efficiency policies. 
3.1. How interaction is defined 
Boonekamp (2006) introduced a definition of interactions between energy efficiency policies and this definition 
became dominant in the literature. It states that a policy interaction means the influence of one measure on the 
energy saving effect of another measure and this influence can be mitigating, neutral or reinforcing. An instrument 
combination is mitigating or overlapping when the combined saving effect is less than the sum of the saving effects 
these instruments would achieve stand-alone. When the combined effect is larger, the combination is reinforcing 
or complementary (Oikonomou et al. 2010; Rosenow et al. 2016). Thus, for a neutral combination, the combined 
saving effect is equal to the sum of the individual saving effects. 
This dominating definition for interactions between energy efficiency policies focuses on, first, direct interactions 
on the instrument level, which ‘may occur when the targets or design characteristics of a policy instrument may 
affect the functioning or result of another policy instrument’ (Spyridaki and Flamos 2014: 1091); second, on the 
impact of interactions on energy savings, i.e. the effectiveness of instrument combinations. Thus, the assessment 
of interaction effects between combinations of energy efficiency policies largely leaves out of consideration other 
policy evaluation criteria, e.g. cost-effectiveness or feasibility concerns, as e.g. applied in the comparative 
assessment of individual energy efficiency policies in this paper (see table 1). We will further discuss this limitation 
in section 4. 
3.2. Literature review 
The majority of research on interactions between energy efficiency policies applies qualitative, theory-based 
approaches, which may reflect the complex policy setting described in section 2.2.  These approaches commonly 
focus on policy design characteristics as a main source of interactions and assess their specific cause and effect 
during the implementation and operation of policy instrument combinations. The following review presents the 
limited literature that addresses interactions between instruments for energy efficiency and savings and shows its 
particular research focus. 
Boonekamp (2006) conducts an ex-post analysis of interactions between household energy efficiency policies in 
the Netherlands from 1990 to 2003, e.g. building codes, information measures and financial incentives. He applies 
a qualitative approach using a matrix of policy combinations to assess pairwise interaction effects. As a basic 
element of the assessment, Boonekamp defines four different conditions for a successful implementation of saving 
options: availability, sufficient knowledge, no restrictions, and motivation. Considering overlaps or synergies in 
the conditions, which different policies address, he assesses the strength and type of interactions between policy 
combinations. Within his quantitative approach, which is an exception in the predominantly qualitative research 
on energy efficiency policy interactions, he quantifies the interaction effects between three major measures (energy 
tax, investment subsidy and regulation of gas use for space heating) using a bottom-up energy simulation model. 
Simulating the combined saving effect of these measures, Boonekamp’s results show mitigating effects between 
them. As a concluding remark, he claims that a higher efficiency requirement and intensity of measures may 
increase mitigating interaction effects and further challenge the effectiveness of policy combinations. To benefit 
from reinforcing interactions a better tuning and timing of combinations is necessary. 
Braathen (2007) conducts a case study analysis and assesses interactions between various environmental policies, 
among those, instrument mixes for residential energy efficiency in the United Kingdom. He identifies possible 
positive interactions between instruments, e.g. considering the effect of information provision, and negative 
interactions, e.g. looking at flexibility restrictions and redundancy issues. The article emphasises that interaction 
effects are case specific, thus policy makers need to evaluate both possible interaction outcomes within their 
specific social, political and economic context in order to apply effective and efficient instrument mixes. 
Braathen’s study builds on a project at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): 
‘Instrument mixes for Environmental Policy’ (OECD 2007). 
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Child et al. (2008) analyse interactions between TWCs and other instruments that aim at a more sustainable use of 
energy in Europe, i.e. tradable green certificates, the EU emissions trading scheme and energy efficiency policies 
(namely building energy certificates; energy taxes; subsidies; soft loans; performance standards and appliance 
labelling; voluntary/negotiated agreements; and information, education and audits). In their research framework, 
they compare and assess the design and implementation process of TWCs and energy efficiency policies, e.g. with 
respect to policy objectives and obligated parties, and thereby identify potential complementarities or overlaps 
when they operate simultaneously. Child et al. primarily consider TWCs as an instrument that provides financial 
support and therefore emphasise its reinforcing saving effect due to a larger amount of affordable energy savings 
in combination with all other energy efficiency policies. 
Oikonomou et al. (2010) make use of the energy and climate policy interactions (ECPI) model developed by 
University of Groningen and National Technical University of Athens. The ECPI model is a decision support tool 
for policy makers, incorporating their individual preferences, and uses a qualitative multi-criteria framework for 
the (ex-ante) analysis of policy interactions. Taking into account environmental, socio-political, financial, 
macroeconomic and technological criteria, the tool measures, if interacting combinations of instruments provide 
an added value (see also Oikonomou et al. 2014; Oikonomou et al. 2012; Oikonomou and Jepma 2008). 
Oikonomou et al. (2010) use the ECPI model to assess different instrument combinations that address energy end-
users: energy and carbon tax, subsidies for energy efficiency, labelling in buildings and white certificates.  They 
find that only subsidies show a reinforcing interaction effect in combination with the other instruments. However, 
as the results highly depend on the policy makers’ preferences, the use of the model aims at emphasising that the 
analysis of interaction effects should consider multiple criteria and does not provide a generally applicable rating 
of interaction effects. 
Rosenow et al. (2016) conduct an analysis of policy instrument combinations within building energy efficiency in 
14 EU countries. They analyse the results of both a theory-based evaluation of policy combinations and a survey 
among experts within the field of energy efficiency policy to identify the effectiveness of different combinations 
and illustrate common combinations in the building sector (e.g. voluntary agreements with purchase subsidies and 
information measures with regulation). The analysis shows that policy makers have implemented many reinforcing 
policy combinations in the building sector. However, a major finding is also that purchase subsidies and access to 
capital measures, which governments commonly apply, tend to overlap and reduce the energy saving effect in 
combination. Rosenow et al. conclude that these results are important to elaborate on, but emphasise that the 
simplified approach of the theoretical assessment, which focuses on the effectiveness of policy combinations and 
does not take into account further policy goals, limits the validity. Thus, future research should conduct more 
contextual analysis. The study partly builds on results from the EU-funded project ‘Energy Saving Policies and 
Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes’ (Rosenow et al. 2015). 
The international initiative bigEE - ‘bridging the information gap on Energy Efficiency in buildings’ - studies how 
to combine policies and measures for energy efficiency in buildings and appliances to achieve potential but still 
untapped energy efficiency improvements. 7 The initiative, which a number of research institutes for technical and 
policy advice on energy and climate challenges initiated, focuses on how policies can potentially reinforce one 
another and finally recommends specific policy packages for building and appliance energy efficiency. Within 
both domains a general recommendation is to combine minimum performance standards with information 
measures and financial incentives to first encourage the market penetration of energy efficient products and 
subsequently be able to strengthen the performance standard to achieve higher future efficiency levels. 
3.3 Interaction assessment 
To what extent policy instruments interact depends to a certain degree on their context, i.e. specific design 
characteristics and framework conditions. However, other factors determine interaction effects context-
                                                          
7 http://www.bigee.net/media/filer_public/2013/11/28/bigee_txt_0006_pg_how_policies_need_to_interact_2.pdf (Accessed 
18 January 2018) 
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independent. The following assessment identifies those influencing factors and discusses specific interaction cases 
with respect to their interaction outcome. 
3.3.1. Influencing factors 
What factors determine, if there is a risk for mitigating or potential for 
reinforcing effects between instrument combinations? By reference to the 
relevant literature, we identify influencing factors and divide them in three 
broad categories: steering mechanism, scope and timing. 
The category steering mechanism comprises the type of incentive that a 
policy provides, i.e. how it shall steer the behaviour of the relevant target 
group. Rosenow et al. (2015, 2016) and Boonekamp (2006) consider the 
steering mechanism in their interaction assessment by reflecting on the class, 
type and function of two or more policies in combination. Rosenow et al. 
(2016) point out that combinations within the same policy class are typically 
mitigating and define six different policy classes: taxation, purchase subsidy, 
access to capital, minimum standards, underpinning measurement standards, 
and information and feedback. Similarly, Boonekamp (2006) concludes that 
instruments of the same type, which he divides into legislation, taxes, 
information and agreements, tend to interact. Furthermore, Boonekamp 
defines four different conditions for a successful implementation of saving options and applies these conditions to 
assess interaction effects between policy combinations qualitatively. The conditions for a successful 
implementation of saving options include availability of saving options, sufficient knowledge, the removal of 
restrictions, and motivation. Boonekamp follows the logic that two or more instruments addressing the same 
condition, e.g. ensuring sufficient knowledge, have a mitigating, combined saving effect. Correspondingly, 
Rosenow et al. (2015) argue that policies fulfilling the same function, e.g. increasing the energy price, reducing 
the price for energy efficiency options or enabling individuals to take account of energy in their purchase decision, 
are likely to cause a mitigating interaction. By definition, the steering mechanism of a policy has a direct impact 
on the behaviour of the targeted energy end-users. Thus, from the end-users’ perspective, the policy class, type or 
function determines their behavioural response, which in turn is an important factor that defines the final saving 
effect of (combinations of) instruments. End-users respond to instruments when the underlying mechanism drives 
them to change behaviour. Using the conditions for a successful implementation of Boonekamp (2006), this change 
is obtainable when instruments provide the potential to save energy, knowledge about the potential and finally a 
motivation to benefit from the potential. Policy instruments encourage these drivers by minimising existing 
barriers, which discourage end-users to invest in energy efficiency and savings, as mentioned before. E.g., 
information and feedback make the energy saving potential more visible to the end-users and enable them to be 
more aware of energy in their consumption behaviour of energy services. Rogge and Reichardt (2016) and 
Rosenow et al. (2017) discuss this point using the concept of comprehensiveness of a policy mix, which ‘captures 
how extensive and exhaustive its elements are’ (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016: 1627) and furthermore, which ‘can 
be assessed according to the degree to which it considers relevant failures and barriers’ (Rosenow et al. 2017: 
97).8 Drawing on that discussion, in the context of interaction effects, two instruments are reinforcing if they 
contribute to the comprehensiveness of a policy mix and are mitigating if they do not, thus if they use the same 
steering mechanism. In other words, considering combinations of energy efficiency policies, the degree to which 
their policy function encourages the same behavioural response determines potential interaction effects, which are 
mitigating when two instruments steer the same behavioural driver of energy efficiency improvement and 
reinforcing otherwise. 
The instrument scope indicates the sector, the technology or the specific energy end-user that an instrument 
addresses, thus the overall target to which a certain policy pertains. Energy efficiency policy can target different 
groups of end-users, also products and technologies. Thus, interactions between policy combinations exist only 
                                                          
8 This definition of comprehensiveness is not exhaustive. For a full discussion see Rogge and Reichardt (2016) and Rosenow 
et al. (2017). 
Steering mechanism 
Policy type/class/function 
Scope 
Sector/technology/end-user 
Timing 
Implementation period/sequence 
Figure 1: Influencing factors of 
interaction effects 
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between policies with the same scope (Boonekamp 2006; Rosenow et al. 2016; Rosenow et al. 2015; Simoes et al. 
2015). Therefore, both Boonekamp (2006) and Rosenow et al. (2016) focus their analysis on instruments targeting 
building energy efficiency. 
The timing factor indicates that two or more instruments can only directly interact when they act simultaneously 
(Boonekamp 2006; Rosenow et al. 2016). Furthermore, policies may interact when their implementation follows 
in sequence (Boonekamp 2006; Sorrell 2003), e.g. expected changes in regulation may both reinforce or mitigate 
present regulation. However, the existing research on interactions of energy efficiency policies focuses on 
interactions at one point in time (Kern et al. 2017). 9 
The general intuition behind the categorisation of influencing factors is that the relevance in interactions of two or 
more instruments increases to the extent that they apply the same steering mechanism, have the same scope and 
act at the same time. Instruments tend to be reinforcing when they are different in at least one of the three 
categories. I.e., when two or more instruments target the same sector at the same time, the interaction between 
them is most likely mitigating when they also use the same steering mechanism, but reinforcing when they are 
different with respect to this factor. This categorisation is very straightforward and simple; however, considering 
the accumulated amount of energy efficiency policies in force (see section 2.2), researchers may use this 
framework as a starting point for a more profound assessment of policy interaction effects. 
3.3.2. Interaction cases 
Table 2 presents interaction cases, which the literature on interactions between energy efficiency policies (section 
3.2) has analysed and discussed. Referring back to the influencing factors, the instrument combinations in table 2 
target the same scope at the same time, thus the steering mechanism determines the interaction outcome. The 
combined saving effect of instrument combinations can be mitigating or reinforcing, as Boonekamp (2006) 
introduced. The aim is to highlight those determinants that are relevant from a general perspective and not only 
apply in the specific context of the studies.  
Instrument combination Mitigating Reinforcing References 
(1) Energy tax and performance standard x 
 
Boonekamp (2006); Braathen (2007) 
(2) Energy tax and financial incentives x x Boonekamp (2006) 
(3) Energy tax and EEOs/TWCs, financial 
incentives, regulation, voluntary 
agreements, energy labelling schemes 
 x 
Child et al. (2008) (for TWCs); Rosenow et 
al. (2016) 
(4) EEOs/TWCs and financial incentives x x Child et al. (2008); Rosenow et al. (2016) 
(5) EEOs/TWCs and voluntary agreements  x  Child et al. (2008); Rosenow et al. (2015)  
(6) Performance standards and financial 
incentives 
x x Rosenow et al. (2015); bigEE 
(7) Subsidies and access to capital 
measures 
x  Rosenow et al. (2016) 
(8) Information measures and all other 
instruments 
 x 
Boonekamp (2006); Braathen (2007); Child 
et al. (2008) (for TWCs); Rosenow et al. 
(2016); bigEE 
Table 2: Mitigating and reinforcing interaction effects between combinations of energy efficiency policies. 
                                                          
9 Kern et al. (2017) analyse the development of policy mixes for energy efficiency over time. Yet, the assessment of sequencing 
interactions between energy efficiency policies is a field for future research. 
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(1) Boonekamp (2006) and Braathen (2007) classify the combination of a performance standard with an energy 
tax as mitigating. Boonekamp (2006) argues that the target group of a standard, which sets a high and legally 
binding requirement, has to fulfil this standard, while a tax would not lead to the implementation of additional 
measures to increase energy efficiency. Thus, he points at the prescriptive policy mechanism of performance 
standards, which force the energy end-user to save energy, thus no further motivation is needed, and defines 
this mechanism as the reason for the mitigating interaction. Braathen (2007) takes this combination as an 
example for mitigating interaction effects, which hinder the effective and efficient functioning of both 
instruments and cause redundancies and unnecessary administrative costs. 
(2) Furthermore, Boonekamp (2006) assesses that the combination of an energy tax with financial incentives, i.e. 
different subsidy schemes, can be mitigating or reinforcing depending on the specific application of the 
subsidy. On the one side, Boonekamp (2006) discusses that both instruments target the motivation of energy 
end-users to invest in energy saving options and together they provide too much motivation, i.e. only one 
instrument would have led to the same investment decision. On the other side, he argues that a subsidy, which 
specifically motivates saving options that are not yet established and still expensive, can have a reinforcing 
interaction with an energy tax. In that case, consumers would not have chosen to implement these saving 
options only motivated by a tax. Thus, the target of a subsidy scheme, i.e. proven or not yet established saving 
options, determines the interaction outcome. 
(3) Rosenow et al. (2016) highlight that a tax on energy has a reinforcing interaction with all other instruments 
they include in their analysis. They argue that the direct price effect of a tax generally increases the incentive 
and motivation of end-users to invest in energy efficient technology and reduce energy consumption, i.e. to use 
financial incentives, implement regulation or join voluntary agreements. Thus, the price mechanism of a tax 
strengthens the functionality of other instruments. Furthermore, Child et al. (2008) classify the combination of 
an energy tax with a TWC scheme as reinforcing and reason that with a tax as the single instrument, end-users 
may choose to pay the tax when it is expensive to reduce consumption. The combination with a white certificate 
scheme, which implies the provision of financial incentives, increases the amount of affordable energy saving 
options and the final energy saving effect. 
(4) Assessing the combination of EEOs with financial incentives, Rosenow et al. (2016) point out that the 
obligation scheme implies a capped saving level, which entails that financial incentives on top of the scheme 
would not achieve additional savings, and classify this combination as mitigating. Thus, similar to the policy 
mechanism of performance standards in (1), the predefined energy saving target of EEOs limits the 
effectiveness of additional financial incentives. On the contrary, Child et al. (2008) conclude that the 
combination of TWCs with financial incentives is reinforcing, because the increase in total compensation for 
energy efficiency investment (increase in financial support available) accelerates technology diffusion of 
energy efficient equipment. However, they also consider that this combination may be an unnecessary use of 
resources once a technology becomes standard in the market. 
(5) Rosenow et al. (2015) classify the combination of voluntary agreements with EEOs as mitigating and argue 
that the obligation scheme sets a certain energy saving target, so that a voluntary agreement, which targets the 
same sector and aims at a similar saving level, would not generate additional savings. Child et al. (2008), when 
assessing the combination of TWCs and voluntary agreements, highlight the challenge of the measurement and 
verification of savings, which the voluntary agreement scheme achieves, as being eligible to count as a saving 
certificate. 
(6) On one side, the combination of performance standards with financial incentives is mitigating, when the 
financial support finances investments that are required by the performance standard, as Rosenow et al. (2015) 
evaluate. In that case, the legally binding target of the standard entails that additional financial incentives do 
not increase effectiveness, but the number of free-riders, here defined as agents that make use of a subsidy, 
although they have to do a certain investment to fulfil the standard. On the other side, the bigEE project argues 
that financial incentives in combination with performance standards are important to trigger energy efficiency 
investments, especially in the presence of high financing barriers. Thus, this combination of policies ensures a 
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broad market introduction of energy efficient products and finally enables policy makers to tighten the standard 
and achieve higher future efficiency levels. 
(7) Furthermore, Rosenow et al. (2016) discuss that two instruments, which both provide a financial incentive for 
energy efficiency investments, cause a mitigating interaction, when the recipient had made the same 
investments in the presence of only one of the two instruments. In that case, the benefit recipient is overpaid. 
(8) All studies categorise the provision of information, especially via labelling schemes, as mutually reinforcing. 
Thus, providing information supports the effectiveness of all other instruments and vice versa. E.g. Braathen 
(2007) illustrates that a label increases the awareness of consumers and therefore their responsiveness to energy 
prices. This effect finally increases the effectiveness of a price-increasing tax on energy. Moreover, consumers 
may be more attentive to a label due to a tax. Thus, the policy mechanism of information provision to increase 
the awareness of end-users towards their energy consumption determines the mutually reinforcing interaction 
with other instruments. Yet, Braathen (2007) also mentions the exceptional case that the provision of too much 
information, e.g. due to the implementation of various different labelling schemes, may cause confusion and a 
mitigating combined effect. Considering the combination of information provision (in particular building 
certificates) with financial incentives, Child et al. (2008) furthermore point out that information provision may 
increase the free-rider problem. I.e., the increase in awareness entails that more consumers would increase their 
energy efficiency investments without financial incentives, but are still able to receive them. 
These interaction cases show a systematic pattern. First, a combination of instruments that enforce a certain target 
of energy efficiency or savings, e.g. performance standards and EEOs, is more likely mitigating. Due to the fixed 
and legally binding target of one instrument, the second instrument does not achieve additional savings beyond 
the target. Considering the steering mechanism as the influencing factor, we can conclude that an enforcing 
mechanism causes more likely a redundancy and therefore a mitigating interaction because the enforcement 
ensures that a certain saving potential is achieved and the targeted energy end-users do not need additional 
knowledge or motivation to be incentivised to invest in energy efficiency and increase energy savings. Second, a 
combination of instruments that are flexible regarding how the target group responds to this instrument, e.g. energy 
taxes and information measures, is more likely reinforcing. The flexibility entails that within this combination one 
instrument does not hamper, but strengthen the functionality of the other instrument. Therefore, their effectiveness 
is higher in combination. In that case the functioning of one steering mechanism, e.g. energy price increase, does 
not make information provision redundant, but both mechanisms together have the potential to complement one 
another, in this example by providing motivation and knowledge, and maximise the final energy saving effect. 
Braathen (2007) draws a similar conclusion. 
 
4. Discussion 
The interaction assessment highlights critical influencing factors, which policy makers should take as a starting 
point when investigating potential mitigating or reinforcing effects between combinations of energy efficiency 
policy. Furthermore, it assesses cases of instrument combinations and the interaction effects between them. The 
identification of these interaction effects will become even more important, when energy efficiency and saving 
targets increase in stringency and policy mixes need to become more effective. The direct and straightforward way 
to increase the energy saving effect of a policy mix would be to maximise reinforcing effects and minimise 
mitigating interactions. This argumentation draws on the predominant research focus on effectiveness as the main 
goal to achieve, however, does not take into account further criteria, which influence policy-making. 
In contrast, Rosenow et al. (2015) remark that ‘it may be legitimate to combine policy instrument types even if the 
overall effect on energy savings is diminishing’ (Rosenow et al. 2015: 18). Drawing on a discussion on double 
regulation from Sorrell et al. (2003), they argue that the avoidance of mitigating interactions should not be the only 
objective, but that it needs a broader assessment of circumstances, in which these interactions might be acceptable 
or unacceptable. The combination of financial incentives and energy performance standards can illustrate the 
argument. Rosenow et al. (2015) evaluate that this combination is mitigating, when the financial support finances 
investments that are required by the performance standard. However, the financial support might only make it 
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affordable for e.g. low-income households to be able to comply with the standard. In that case, the perceived 
mitigating interaction addresses social equity concerns. Thus, including governmental concerns beyond the energy 
saving target in the assessment of this policy combination, could change the evaluation of the interaction effect. 
Furthermore, researchers have paid only limited attention on the impact of interactions on the efficiency or cost-
effectiveness of instrument combinations. Boonekamp (2006) and Rosenow et al. (2016) do not consider cost-
effectiveness in their assessments and Rosenow et al. argue that this is due to a lack of evidence on the cost side. 
In the OECD project report (OECD 2007) efficiency considerations are limited to the theoretical discussion that 
policy makers should add additional instruments to an existing instrument mix at the lowest marginal costs possible 
and only if marginal benefits are larger than marginal costs. Braathen (2007) mentions the case that overlapping 
instruments cause redundancies and thus unnecessary administrative costs. Administrative costs are also part of 
the multi-criteria approach of the ECPI model, besides compliance and transaction costs (Oikonomou et al. 2014, 
2012, 2010). However, the existing research has not thoroughly assessed the impact of interactions on efficiency 
or administration and compliance costs of instrument combinations. 
Future work on interaction effects of energy efficiency policies should extend the predominant research focus and 
include assessment criteria beyond effectiveness, such as efficiency and feasibility. Furthermore, the research on 
interactions between energy efficiency policies is largely limited to qualitative and theory-based approaches. Thus, 
the quantification of interaction effects between policy combinations is an area, where a gap of knowledge exists. 
Future research should investigate case studies of instrument combinations, where relevant data on the (cost-) 
effectiveness of specific instruments, stand-alone and in combination, is available. Considering the challenges to 
empirically derive the impact of energy efficiency policies in real world applications, there may be a need for 
controlled experiments, which could test and evaluate different combinations of instruments. Various studies have 
already used this approach to investigate the effect of single instruments (e.g. Allcott and Rogers 2014; Gleerup et 
al. 2010). A careful combination of qualitative and quantitative results of (multi-criteria) interaction assessments 
could sharpen the analysis of interactions between energy efficiency policies. In particular, the combination could 
enable to make concrete statements on the magnitude and importance of interaction effects. I.e., the results could 
clarify, if mitigating interactions are a major problem that should make us reduce the number of applied 
instruments or how reinforcing effects could optimise the implementation of a policy mix for energy efficiency 
and savings. The existing research has not drawn conclusions on the magnitude and importance of interactions, 
although information on this issue may be most important for policy making. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Policy makers can choose to implement various policy instruments to foster future energy efficiency and savings. 
These instruments all have their individual strengths and weaknesses, which policy makers should balance in the 
process of finding the appropriate instrument(s) for a specific policy context. In many cases, they choose to 
implement not only one instrument, but a combination of instruments, which all target energy efficiency 
improvements and savings. In that case, interactions between these instruments are inevitable. By definition, 
interactions can be reinforcing, neutral or mitigating depending on the combined saving effect of instrument 
combinations. The interaction assessment of this paper shows that the steering mechanism, the scope and the 
timing of two or more instruments influence the interaction outcome. Furthermore, the assessment identifies that 
a combination of instruments that enforce a certain target of energy efficiency and savings is more likely 
mitigating, while a combination of instruments that are flexible regarding how the target group responds to this 
instrument is more likely reinforcing. However, the existing research on interaction effects of energy efficiency 
policies is restricted to mainly qualitative results focusing on the energy saving effect of instrument combinations 
as the main evaluation criterion. Thus, the magnitude and importance of interaction effects is yet unclear. 
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